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THE VALUES OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY
IN HOMICIDE LAW REFORM
Robert Weisberg*

Professor Reid Fontaine's article, Adequate (Non)Provocation and Heat of
Passion as Excuse Not Justification, makes a convincing casefor treating heat
of passion wholly as an excuse not a justification, as the only sensible way to comprehend its various forms. In doing so, Professor Fontaine stimulates further
thinking about heat of passion doctrine, along two dimensions. On the one hand,
his analysis of doctrine motivates deeper inquiry within the realm of doctrine itself-specifically, about the under-examined category of second-degree intentional
murder and its core notion of "impulsive intent." On the other hand, Professor
Fontaine induces us to consider a range of extra-doctrinal questions, especially
those about the psychological concept of the personality disorder and the philosophical notion of moral luck to explain the paradoxicalpotential harmony between
the unreasonableand the rational.

I. INTRODUCTION
Professor Fontaine argues that the debate over voluntary manslaughter under the heat of passion (HOP) or provocation
doctrine-the debate whether it is a partial justification or partial
excuse-can now be settled. He asserts that if we hope to establish
any jurisprudential coherence for HOP manslaughter, we must
fully commit to viewing that doctrine as a partial excuse, because
the partial justification theory simply cannot accommodate the
modern range of judicial and statutory forms that HOP takes.' I
find his argument and demonstration thereof quite convincing, so
my purpose here is not to enter the justification vs. excuse debate
itself. Rather, I want to take the opportunity of reading this article
to elaborate some of the wider implications of the excuse theory of
manslaughter as Professor Fontaine has conceived it. And in doing
so, I am also taking the opportunity of reaching back into two of
Professor Fontaine's earlier articles to fill out the argument in his
new one.
Many law review authors engage in the ritual, if harmless trope,
of self-citation early in their new work. In this case, however, I
*

B.A., City College of New York; Ph.D., Harvard University; J.D. Stanford Law

School; Edwin E. Huddleson,Jr. Professor of Law, Stanford University; Co-Director, Stanford
Criminal Justice Center.
1.
Reid G. Fontaine, Adequate (Non)Provocationand Heat of Passion as Excuse Not Justification, 43 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 27 (2009).
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found it very illuminating to examine Professor Fontaine's two
relevant earlier articles, The Wrongfulness of Wrongly Interpreting
Wrongfulness: Provocation Interpretational Bias and Heat of Passion
Homicide and Disentangling the Psychology and Law of Instrumental
and Reactive Subtypes of Aggression. Indeed, I have been so presumptuous as to make my reading of Adequate (Non)Provocationa reading
of the trio of related articles as a minibody of work. And as I do so,
I observe that Professor Fontaine's overall thesis has at least several
components, and runs something like this:
Read comprehensively, as a matter of positive law, HOP doctrine
makes sense only as a partial excuse; and in normative terms as
well, the HOP principle should be so viewed, and so viewed rather
broadly. That is, modern homicide law focuses too narrowly on
emotional dysfunctionality-hyper-passionate impulsiveness-as
the paradigm of HOP. Once properly viewed as an excuse, HOP
should also include cognitive dysfunctionality of the kind that falls
under such scientific names as "hostile attribution bias" or provocation interpretational bias (PIB) . Extending HOP to the
cognitive dimension makes good retributivist sense, because deficits in cognitive capacity and deficits in emotional self-control both
bear on the level of responsibility at issue in our allocation of
moral condemnation.
The goal of Professor Fontaine's new article is obviously a classification project involving the proper coordination of legal, moral,
and psychological categories, and my goal in this Essay is to suggest
that the classification effort poses more challenges than Professor
Fontaine may have acknowledged. The most basic challenge to
proper classification for Professor Fontaine's overall project is his
concern with the general idea that reasonable people sometimes
can be very unreasonable. In the following passage he tries to capture the standard paradox of HOP doctrine, but he does so in a
way that suggests he finds the problem vexing and mysterious.
If a truly (or reliably) reasonable person, then, would not lose
control in response to the subject provocation, it may be inferred that the meaning of the reasonable person
requirement is not that a reasonable person would lose selfcontrol. Rather, the reasonable person requirement may be
interpreted to mean that it is at least somewhat understand2.
Reid G. Fontaine, The Wrongfulness of Wrongly Interpreting Wrongfulness: Provocation,
InterpretationalBias, andHeat of PassionHomicide, 12 NEW CRIM. L. REv. 69 (2009).
3.
Reid G. Fontaine, Disentangling the Psychology and Law of Instrumental and Reactive
Subtypes of Aggression, 13 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 143 (2007).
4.
Fontaine, supra note 1, at 30-31 & n.12; Fontaine, supra note 2, at 90-91.
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able (and thus excusable) for a person to lose control and act
unreasonably when presented with a substantial provocation5
Professor Fontaine recognizes that that this oft-noted paradox in
fact rests on many unsettled questions about law, morality, and psychology. More specifically, filling out the HOP picture in this way
involves seeing and reconciling several conceptual pairings or distinctions: (1) the legal distinction between murder and
manslaughter; (2) the psychological distinction between instrumental and reactive aggression;6 and (3) the distinction between
an interpretationaland an emotional disorder. Professor Fontaine
delves into the relationship between the latter two pairings as a
means to address the first one. But in doing so, he also brings in a
related pairing, the difference between PIB and the more common
(and commonly misunderstood) categories of psychopathy and
sociopathy The complexity of coordinating these distinctions becomes daunting and awaits further work in terms of psychological
science, moral philosophy, and legal rulemaking.
Roughly speaking, my Essay makes two points: (1) as a matter of
law, we need a fuller examination of the category of second-degree
intentional murder; and (2) the various types of emotional and
cognitive deficits in manslaughter must be explored as part of the
larger question of how law depends on both the psychology of personality disorders and the philosophical conundrum of moral luck.
Let me therefore note my own paradox: In reaching back into Professor Fontaine's earlier articles I am moving in two somewhat
opposite directions. I suggest that Professor Fontaine's thesis in his
new article is, on the one hand, not quite doctrinally focused
enough and, on the other hand, too purely doctrinal because it
does not fully explore its interdisciplinary implications.
II.

THE UNDERAPPRECIATED MURDER CATEGORY

Professor Fontaine pays brief rhetorical fealty to the mundane
point that there are traditionally two levels of intentional murderpremeditated murder and plain vanilla intentional murder. This is
the distinction at the heart of the first-degree/second-degree divide,
but he suggests that the distinction is no longer very important. As
Fontaine, supra note 2, at 74-75. He also ponders whether he can solve the para5.
dox by altering "reasonable" to "ordinary," but he finds that ready solution illusory. Id. at. 75
n.19.
Fontaine, supranote 1, at 31; Fontaine, supranote 3, at 155.
6.
This is evident in Fontaine, supra note 3, at 156.
7.
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a matter of positive law, he notes, some states have abolished it (as
did the MPC). At several key points he insists on defining murder
in terms of cool deliberation in a way that suggests that the premeditation formula is more or less coincident with the definition
of murder." The problem in doing so is that he leaves a big void in
terms of second-degree intentional murder, and his thesis does not
quite support erasure of the concept.
This is in part because the rumors of the demise of the degree
distinction are greatly exaggerated. There may be movement towards eliminating the degree distinction, but the majority of states
maintain the traditional categories of murder.'0 The consequences
of the distinction are undeniable: generally, in degreedistinguishing states, only first-degree can make the defendant eligible for the death penalty, and, more numerically important, the
non-capital sentencing differential is large. Those who attack the
distinction plausibly argue that the premeditation formula is hopelessly vague and arbitrary i but it is disingenuous to deny that a
single category of intentional murder would be worrisomely broad
and heterogeneous. At the very least, if Professor Fontaine's goal is
to enhance the coherence of our criminal law categories, he would
have to bear some burden of proof to establish that the degree distinction should be abolished.
He will face some difficulty in meeting that burden, because a
second reason to resist Professor Fontaine's preference for erasure
of the degree distinction is that Professor Fontaine's HOP thesis
underscores the need to pay more than merely dismissive attention
to the category of second-degree intentional murder. Let us consider what killings fall into the traditional second-degree category
and what killings would still do so under Professor Fontaine's thesis. In his review of cases and statutes defining HOP, Professor
Fontaine acknowledges that lots of defendants plead HOP and
fail.1" But in the cases of failure he allows for, the defendants' factual claims that are insufficient to prove HOP under various
formulas are hardly consistent with the image of the defendant as
the cool decision maker, much less the long-calculating planner
exhibiting what might formally count as premeditation. That
means that Professor Fontaine implicitly acknowledges that we
8.
Id. at 147 & n.4, 153-54.
9.
Fontaine, supra note 1, at 31; Fontaine, supra note 2, at 71, 76, 8; Fontaine, supra
note 3, at 144, 147.
10.
WA.YNE LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 766 (4th ed. 2003).
11.

The classic statement of this concern is BENJAMIN CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE

AND OTHER ESSAYS 99-100 (4th ed. 1938) (1931).
12.
E.g., Fontaine, supra note 1, at 33-40.
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need second-degree intentional murder as the default category of
murder into which failed HOP claims fall, and that category can
hardly be described as the set of dispassionate killings.
1
In a state like California that uses both the degree distinction 3
and an MPC-style heat of passion formula (and Professor Fontaine
assumes the validity of the latter), a person who exhibits emotional
distress in a particular situation where there is no reasonable excuse for doing so can be guilty of second-degree murder. This can
be a person who is generally hot-headed in response to stressful
situations, even those where the ordinary reasonable person would
not be greatly stressed, but who suffers no diagnosable mental illness. Professor Fontaine laments that right now, under modern
homicide law, the category of murder includes the emotional killer
whose emotion is actually quite "partly rational" if we grant the killer's premises-i.e., if he is correct to interpret the situation as
provocative, as where the husband, being somewhat paranoid and
jealous, construes the sight of a possibly innocuous encounter between the spouse and another as evidence of a sexual relationship.
And indeed, under the old doctrine of State v. Yanz, 14 which Professor Fontaine treats as solid law, a person who makes a factual
mistake about a stressful situation-i.e., perhaps misidentifying the
person who might have provoked him-is only guilty of voluntary
manslaughter if his mistake is reasonable. But he would be a second-degree murderer if his mistake was unreasonable, even if
honest. That unreasonable but honest mistake may be due to a
kind of "cognitive impulsiveness" (to use my own admittedly blurry
term) or it might be part of a category that Professor Fontaine
himself interestingly adds to the discussion, "cognitive carelessness."' 15 Whereas Professor Fontaine would like to place under the
manslaughter category one who is not fully responsible for his own
PIB problems, the cognitively careless person would get no such
sympathy. This person is, in criminal mens rea terms, negligent
with respect to the perception of the factor that would cause distress. To stretch our criminal law vocabulary, this would be a case of
"imperfect heat of passion," by analogy to "imperfect self-defense."
Thus, even though Professor Fontaine would like to shrink the
category of murders that represent failed manslaughter-mitigation
cases, under his formulation it still would hardly remain a null set.
13.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (2008).
14.
50 A. 37 (Conn. 1901). See People v. Berry, 556 P.2d 777 (1976) (holding that defendant was entitled to manslaughter instruction where cumulative effect of decedent's
taunting behavior was reasonable psychological explanation of defendant's homicidal passion).
15.
Fontaine, supra note 2, at 78.
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The set would include a number of types of mental states that are
very hard to reconcile with his often-cited notion that murder is
cool and deliberative, if not formally premeditated. So I suggest
that Professor Fontaine's excuse theory of HOP is an opportunity
for exploring the odd nature of second-degree murder, the most
unexplored of the levels of homicide. I will briefly sketch out some
of the possibilities that Professor Fontaine has motivated me to reflect on.
In doing so, let me first get a little legal pedantry out of the way.
I am focusing on intentional killings, and I am therefore setting
aside, at least temporarily, such other categories as second-degree
extreme indifference (or grossly reckless, or "depraved heart")
murder,1 6 as well as felony murder (which can be first- or seconddegree in some jurisdictions that use degrees)," as well, of course,
as the various forms of involuntary manslaughter."' In addition, I
will put aside the one key version of voluntary manslaughter that
sits aside HOP-namely, so-called imperfect self-defense."" I will
however return to these briefly below to see if they can be brought
into the mix.
Second-degree intentional murder gets little doctrinal attention
because as a matter of substantive law it seems so simple. In fact, in
the standard parsing of mens rea distinctions under MPC-inspired
codes, purposive or intention itself seems the easiest of mental
states to define. 20 Doctrinal discussion of it tends to be limited to
the somewhat slippery distinction between purpose and knowledge
when the relevant element is a fact, not an action, and, as a result,
intentionality gets somewhat implicated in the discussion of "willful
ignorance." 2' But otherwise, and as a casebook editor I plead guilty
to reinforcing this view myself, in discussions of intentional murder
the interesting case law all seems procedural or evidentiary. 22 Most
notably, the Sandstrom line of cases tells us that the prosecution
must prove purpose to kill beyond a reasonable doubt-it cannot
rely on any presumption about how people normally intend the
predictable consequences of their actions. 23

16.
17.
18.

LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 739-44.

19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 790-91.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (a) (1985).
SeeUnited States vJewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700-01 (1976).
E.g., JOHN KAPLAN, ROBERT WEISBERG & GuVoRA BINDER,

Id. at 744-65.
Id. at 793-809.

AND MATERIALS

23.

(1985).

CRIMINAL

LAW: CASES

325-80 (6th ed. 2008).

Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979); Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307
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The closest we get to an affirmative definition of intentional
murder is still as a default category-in the cases where the prosecution has difficulty proving premeditation. Only in the rare
appellate case is the premeditation count rejected because of a
faulty instruction or insufficient evidence. Where that happens, if
the formula is a fairly high and formal hurdle-some quantity
component of duration of the intent or a very strong quality component of exceptional coolness-then a decision for reversal may
suggest that the killer is still guilty of murder because he acted with
what we might have to call a "rational impulse. 2 4 That is, he did
not plan for long, and he did not engage in dialectical thinking,
turning over in his head whether or not to kill, and he did not take
an elaborated series of planning steps. Rather, he just decided to
kill, and he killed.
As a practical matter, the issue is more likely to arise in a charging decision. An infamous case in the history of Stanford University
itself is illustrative. In 1978 Theodore Streleski, a frustrated and
embittered long-time graduate student in Mathematics, walked by
the office of a professor whom he somewhat knew and beat the
professor to death with a ball-peen hammer.' Streleski was convicted of second-degree murder. It was murder because he did not
proffer evidence that could have conceivably provided any HOP
mitigation (or insanity), but it was only second-degree murder because with no eyewitnesses or evidence of planning, the prosecutor
could not prove premeditation. 26
In the Streleski case, the evidence was unclear as to why the killer chose this particular victim, who had been one of the most
popular members of the faculty and the one most sympathetic to
students. If Streleski had earlier decided to kill whichever professor
seemed most vulnerable when he strode through the building, the
last minute decision to kill this victim might still have fit the premeditation formula.
But what if Streleski had no such plan? Instead, let us assume
that upon seeing a professor, he immediately decided that killing
the professor was desirable. We then would have a case of "rational
impulse"-with the term "impulse" largely serving to eliminate the
E.g., People v.Plummer, 581 N.W.2d 753 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
24.
25.
For one summary of the story, see Dennis Overbye, When Student-Advisor 7ensions
Erupt, The Results Can be Fatal, N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 27, 2007, at F2.
26.
In the most famous of recent California murder cases, the prosecutor charged O.J.
Simpson with first-degree premeditated murder. Had Simpson not made an alibi defensehad he conceded his fatal act of stabbing but argued mens rea-the arguments, evidence,
and instructions might well have produced a very vigorous debate over non-premeditated
intentional killing as a possibility.
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durational element of premeditation, and not necessarily implying
hotheadedness in any way. Clearly Streleski would have had a motive, an instrumental reason for 'killing. He wanted to punish a
faculty member. Now of course, as Professor Fontaine notes, motive itself is not a formal element of homicide; but he also
acknowledges that when we deal with degrees of homicide, especially HOP, we often must address questions of motive when we
apply the formal mens rea elements.27 So one category of second-

degree murder is the killing which is rationally motivated but
where, to use the non-legal term, the motive awaits the right opportunity to even come into the killer's mind or it lies dormant
until the opportunity induces its coming to consciousness (i.e.,
where the motive had not previously developed into a planned desire to kill, and hence could still be treated as premeditation).
But then there are cases where the notion of a previously conceived motive makes little sense because the motive itself is
specifically generated by the situation. (a) Our subject is planning
a larceny but never thinks about the possible need to eliminate a
witness. But a witness suddenly appears as our subject is doing the
stealing, and our subject immediately but calmly decides to kill the
witness. (b) Our subject meets a second person already known to
him, and the second person surprises our subject by exhibiting
some previously undisclosed characteristic which our subject
deems unacceptable, and on the spot our subject kills the second
person. In case (a) we might imagine that if, as a practical (not
moral!) matter, our subject had more time to consider the wisdom
of the killing, he might have chosen otherwise. But in many cases
protraction of opportunity would make no difference. And in (b),
protraction is perfectly possible but its irrelevance is a matter of
the killer's choice. So there are many cases where killing is temporally spontaneous and in a limited sense, "impulsive," but where
the killer calmly sees the action unequivocally as "rational" or the
outcome as something to which he is fully entitled 8
Thus, we implicitly have a category of second-degree murder
where a person simply makes a decision to kill for some reason and
then kills almost immediately. Of course, an alternative example is
Stephen's famous case of the man pushing the child into the
river. '9 This comes close to Coleridge's famous notion of "motiveless [m]alignity," derived from his reading of the character of Jago
27.

Fontaine, supra note 1, at 46.

28.

SeeJACK KATZ, SEDUCTIONS OF CRIME: MORAL AND SENSUAL ATTRACTIONS IN

INC EVIL

29.

18-19 (1988).
Fontaine, supra note 3, at 154.

Do-
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in Othello.30 Of course lago himself did have a motive, and we might
even say the man in the Stephen hypo did as well if we can imagine
the motive being the pursuit of simple sadistic pleasure.
Now, if forced to confront the issue of second-degree intentional
murder, Professor Fontaine might refuse the bait. He might disavow any obligation to imbue it with any coherent affirmative
meaning. In other words, he might fully embrace its status as
merely the operative downward default when the prosecutor cannot prove premeditation but the killer clearly had purpose, and
the upward default when HOP fails. If so, what are we left with substantively? The second-degree set could be the sum of those
defaults plus my somewhat invented category of "rational impulse."
But so strong is Professor Fontaine's commitment to rendering the
category of voluntary manslaughter more coherent that it would be
disingenuous for him to disavow any such need for murder categories.
Those defending the exclusion of this PIB killer from voluntary
manslaughter might argue that because the deficit lies in cognition, not mood control, the killing is really "rational" or
"instrumental." That would be a weak rejoinder, since it illogically
elides "cognitive" with "rational." Professor Fontaine might respond that if some people exhibiting PIB have understandable
reasons for that condition, then they are not really different from
people who are somewhat more hotheaded than the norm, and
who overreact in situations where some negative reaction would be
common. At this point, the distinction between instrumental and
reactive aggression may enter the picture. Professor Fontaine
might well call both PIB and emotional impulse killings reactive,
and thus he would use the category of the reactive killing as a defining notion for manslaughter. But that might suggest that
second-degree intentional murder must be a species of instrumental aggression, and if so, distinguishing premeditated from
"impulsive instrumental" killings remains a challenge. Moreover, as
noted below, however tempting the instrumental/reactive distinction is for Professor Fontaine, he turns out to be sensibly agnostic
about how clear a distinction it is in the world of psychology from
which it emerges. 31
These questions will lead me to my second set of observations
inspired by Professor Fontaine's article(s). But before I get to that,

30.

5

SAMUEL

TAYLOR

COLERIDGE,

TAYLOR COLERIDGE: LECTURES

1987).
31.

Lecture 5, in

1808-1819

See generally Fontaine, supra note 3.

THE COLLECTED WORKS

ON LITERATURE

OF SAMUEL

II 315 (Kathleen Coburn ed.,
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I will make one more foray into pure doctrine by speculating on
how another component of murder law, so-called extreme indifference murder, might assist in my proposed definitional project.
Extreme indifference murder is a species of aggravated recklessness.32 If a reckless person consciously adverts to and chooses to act
in the face of an unreasonable risk of serious harm, then extreme
indifference is the mental state in which one or more of the components of the definitions of recklessness is aggravated-the
degree of conscious adversion, the seriousness of the harm, etc.
And in its homicide form, what California identifies under the
venerable but melodramatic term "abandoned and malignant
heart murder" is a grossly reckless killing.3 This doctrine is very
important in modern criminal law, especially as an Eighth
Amendment standard for death penalty cases. 4 But it also has
some resonant and normative power in providing some meaning
to the otherwise obsolete term "malice," and it can thereby help us
harmonize the range of killings placed under a murder category.
Let us use the language of extreme indifference to suggest an
antisocial attitude whereby the person elevates his own selfish interest over the value of another's life. If so, the extreme
indifference idea might help explain felony murder-i.e., any serious risk of death undertaken where the 'justification" for doing so
is the selfish aim of a felony like a robbery, manifests extreme indifference and hence should be murder.3 - And, conversely, even if a
killing is not coolly premeditated but rather immediate and impulsive, as in some of my examples above, it is second-degree murder
because it involves placing an unworthy selfish motivation over the
life of another.

32.

LAFAVE,

33.

CAL. PENAL CODE §

supranote 10, at 739-44.
188 (2008).

34.
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (holding that extreme indifference is sufficient culpability standard for death penalty).
35.
See Guyora Binder, The Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57 STAN. L. REV. 59,
162-64 (2004).
36.
The temptation to read a strong normative component into the definition of murder became controversial in California decades ago. In People v. Conley, 411 P.2d 911 (Cal.
1966), the Supreme Court of California suggested that even if the state proved the technical
elements of murder, such as intent, the crime could still be manslaughter if the defendant
lacked "malice" in a normative sense. An angry legislature overruled Conley with the following language now embedded in CAL. PENAL CODE § 188:

[M]alice may be express or implied. It is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature. It is implied, when
no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.

FALL

2009]

Values of Interdisciplinarityin Law Reform

Whether working with the evocative but vague idea of extreme
indifference can so advance this definitional project is contestable.
For now, I offer it merely to show how the project that, in my view,
Professor Fontaine has implicitly identified for us, has some rich
material to work with.
III.

THE NEED TO FULLY EMBRACE PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

If my first set of observations has to do with Professor Fontaine
not having pushed doctrinalism quite far enough, my second has
to do with his tendency, as in some of his earlier articles, to go perhaps too far beyond doctrine.
In Disentanglingthe Psychology and Law of Instrumental and Reactive

Subtypes of Aggression, Professor Fontaine cites and interacts with a
very striking recent article by Bushman and Anderson, Is It Time to
Pull the Plug on the Hostile Versus InstrumentalAggression Dichotomy ?

Written by two non-lawyer psychologists, this article boldly goes
where Professor Fontaine appears to want to go, but Professor
Fontaine is understandably cautious of moving as far so quickly. As
a legal matter, even more explicitly than Professor Fontaine,
Bushman & Anderson argue that positive law is moving strongly
away from degree distinctions.3 And they reveal a strong normative
investment in that legal change, because of a parallel distinction in
psychology they would like to erase or, at least, challenge. This is
the distinction between hostile and instrumental aggression, which
is roughly coincident with the "reactive/instrumental" difference
quite prominent in modern psychology (and the latter is the terminology which Professor Fontaine uses in his discussions of
psychology).
Bushman and Anderson offer very intriguing theory and data to
suggest that the hostile/instrumental distinction cannot be supported. They say that the key to understanding the decision to
commit an act-including a homicide-is to see the decision as a

When it is shown that the killing resulted from the intentional doing of an act with

express or implied malice as defined above, no other mental state need be shown to
establish the mental state of malice aforethought. Neither an awareness of the obligation to act within the general body of laws regulating society nor acting despite such
awareness is included within the definition of malice.
§ 188 (2008) (emphasis added).
37.
Brad J. Bushman & Craig A. Anderson, Is it Time to Pull the Plug on the Hostile Versus
InstrumentalAggression Dichotomy ?, 108 PSYCHOL. REv. 273 (2001).
CAL. PENAL CODE

38.

Id. at 273-74.
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process of drawing on previously established knowledge frames,
and that what appear to be non-reflective, or hostile/reactive actions differ only in degree from more ostensibly instrumental
ones.3 9 The details of their thesis and its proof are complex but
have to do with the degree to which the actor has a pre-established
store of frames and motives which can be fairly quickly retrieved.
In that sense, ostensibly reactive or hostile killings do not simply
arise from the apparent triggering event, but result from a considerable amount of prior mentation by the actor.
If Bushman and Anderson are right on their psychology, then
drawing a legal distinction solely along the lines of the hostile/instrumental divide is wrong. On the other hand, once we
accept that the law can sometimes legitimately draw a culpability
line at what it considers a meaningful point in a continuum, then
Bushman and Anderson may have inadvertently undermined their
argument for eliminating the degree distinction in murder. Rather,
they have given us the psychological apparatus to identify some
categories of rational killings that might otherwise look too "reactive" to satisfy us that they should be treated as murder, and we
could still distinguish some of these killings from a more egregiously deliberated group we would call the premeditated.
My point about Bushman and Anderson bears on my reading of
Professor Fontaine. Mostly implicitly in his new article (with a few
explicit references)-but in considerable explicit detail in the earlier articles-Professor Fontaine, to his credit, wants to enrich his
criminal jurisprudence with modern psychology. That means that
his excuse theory of manslaughter raises, and demands more attention to, major questions about how certain categories of
psychology, including the vexing one of the personality disorders,
should bear on law.
In Disentanglingthe Psychology and Law of Instrumental and Reactive
Subtypes ofAggression, Professor Fontaine is quite anxious to draw on
psychological resources. He seems tempted to rely on the
established reactive/instrumental distinction because it might
support his legal argument for (a) treating HOP as an excuse and
(b) including PIB cases under the voluntary manslaughter
umbrella. On the other hand, he is at least skeptical about the
validity of the distinction (if more tentative in his view than are
Bushman and Anderson), noting that there are overlaps in the
incidences and developmental etiologies of the two forms of
aggression. Indeed, Professor Fontaine refers to quite a number of
"dichotomous models of aggression" to complete the picture of the
39.

Id. at 275-77.
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current scientific research. His discussion of these is rich and
nuanced. 40 But even while he is properly cautious about expecting
scientific distinctions to map easily on to legal ones, he does, like
Bushman and Anderson, tend to analogize the key dichotomies
(involving, whatever the vocabulary, passion and emotion) to the
legal distinction between "malice aforethought" and "heat of
passion" and thereby assumes away the problem of providing some
affirmative conception of second-degree murder. The temptation
he shares with them to view this as the salient legal distinction
suggests that he still struggles with whether and how to address the
mapping difficulty.
In his effort to explore the relationship of psychology and
criminal law, Professor Fontaine thrusts himself into a double
debate: 1) how coherent is the distinction between instrumental
and reactive aggression, and 2) how much we might or should
expect legal homicide distinctions to map on to whatever scientific
distinctions emerge as reliable. Professor Fontaine is very
ambivalent on both scores, but he is nevertheless very interested in
the possibility of both clarifying distinctions with the separate fields
of psychology and law and then coordinating the two sets of
distinctions. Thus, he exhibits great faith in social information
processing theory, 4' but he is careful to note that SIP at this point
does not clearly answer the first question. If anything, what we call
reactive and instrumental aggression are reflected in different
stages of the SIP process-along such stages as encoding of cues,
interpretation of cues, clarification of goals, and response
evaluation and decision-making. So in a sense they differ as matter
of degree, not kind, and he makes similar observations about the
neurobiology of these phenomena.
To complicate things further, Professor Fontaine is very ambivalent about the findings and consequences of the important
Bushman-Anderson article. A key problem is that because they
(more firmly than Professor Fontaine) continually elide murder
with premeditation, their argument for eliminating degree distinctions also complicates the murder/manslaughter distinction. It
leaves unclear whether they would move more manslaughters to
murder or vice-versa. Professor Fontaine explicitly raises this concern and also criticizes Bushman and Anderson for their superficial
treatment of the role of motive in criminal law. They assert that motive is not an element of murder and use that notion to buttress the
40.
41.
42.

Fontaine, supra note 3, at 143, 153-55.
Fontaine, supra note 1, at 31; Fontaine, supra note 2, at 74, 81.
Fontaine, supra note 3, at 156-58.
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argument for eliding reactive and instrumental killings, whereas
Professor Fontaine rightly notes that motive is still important in the
instrumental/reactive distinction, and he therefore concludes that
Bushman and Anderson have failed to note the differences in dis43
courses. Nevertheless, Professor Fontaine may have this backward;
the real point is that Bushman and Anderson may have underestimated the role of motive in law. He then links from Bushman and
Anderson to purely utilitarian questions of whether impulsivity
should require more severe sanctions because of predictions of
danger,44 but I concern myself only with retributivist implications
here.
Professor Fontaine nicely notes the scientific evidence that reactive aggressive behavioral patterns are often rooted in perceptual
encoding patterns. But if so, the challenge of deciding whether
and how to distinguish reactive from instrumental aggression, and
whether to make a legal distinction out of the psychological one,
remains daunting. One way out would be to associate the instrumental aggressor more with a deficit in moral appreciation than
cognitive perception. This approach sensibly leads Professor
Fontaine to consider the relationship of the instrumental aggression and that of SIP, to the phenomenon of psychopathy.45
Psychopathy becomes of especially strong interest to him when he
considers utilitarian, as opposed to retributive, legal concerns. But
he is ambivalent about the relevance of psychopathy to his main
concern. He hints of an association of the psychopath with the instrumental aggressor, and the latter with a cognitive deficit more
than an emotional regulation deficit, with the possible implication
that instrumental and perhaps psychopathic killers are actually less
culpable than reactive ones for this reason.4 6 But if so, Professor
Fontaine may have proved too much, because he may have implicitly expanded the HOP or partial excuse category more than he
intended.
As Professor Fontaine delves further into the psychology, his
taxonomic efforts become more nuanced, but also more uncertain.
He says that the categories of the instrumental and reactive have
different etiological foundations but that both result in loss of self

43. Id. at 160.
44. Id. at 155-57.
45. Id. at 156-57.
46. For a superb discussion of the culpability of the psychopath, addressing both the
psychology-law link at issue here and the matter of moral luck discussed below, see Paul
Litton, Responsibility Status of the Psychopath: On Moral Reasoning and Rational Self-Governance,
39 RUTGERS LJ. 349 (2008).
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control. 47 Instrumental violence may derive from a purely biological amygdala dysfunction that affects decision-making, a matter of
serotonin and neurotransmitters. Applying another matrix, he
notes that psychopathic behavior may result from information
processing deficits that disrupt self regulation, while SIP focuses
more on inability to synthesize social cues. 8 The latter suggests
that, contrary to the former, the instrumentally violent offender
processes information through self-regulating mechanisms. It is
not clear, however, how big the differences between these strands
of inquiry are, and hence we get worrisome sentences like the following:
The point for legal and social policy is that individuals who
enact instrumental aggression may do so simply because they
are inclined to for several reasons (e.g., persistent reinforcement based on enactive and observational learning) and not
because they are incapable of normal moral development or
are unable to control or manage themselves. 9
This point raises concerns about cure-with the implication that if
cognitive and reactive deficits are more curable, instrumental violence may be more culpable than reactive violence. 50 But Professor
Fontaine says that the opposite may be true because of the issue of
motive-that is, maybe reactive aggressors are more curable because they act out of perceived threats and thus can be trained out
of their misperceptions. 51 By this reckoning, the reactive aggressor's misperception is not in that person's interest, and the natural
incentive to enhance self-interest might enable the aggressor to unlearn the misperception. Would that mean that the instrumental
aggressor turns out to be less curable than the reactive one?
Professor Fontaine even adverts to the idea that what distinguishes the instrumental offender is that he consciously weighs the
victim's harm against anticipated realization of his own goals and is
hence guiltier than the reactive aggressor, who does no such weighing. This interpretation brings the instrumental aggressor much
closer to the psychopath: "Whereas [reactive aggressors are]
viewed by society as suffering from emotional and psychological

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Fontaine, supranote 3, at 155-57.
Id. at 157.
Id.at 158.
Id. at 156.
Id. at 159-60.
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disturbances, instrumental aggressors
are judged to be mentally
52
capable, degenerate wrongdoers.

In his new article Professor Fontaine alludes to the science underlying PIB-namely Social Information Processing (SIP)-and in
Disentanglingthe Psychology and Law of Reactive and Instrumental Sub-

types of Aggression he offers a very rigorous review of this science.
The scientific explanation of the deficits in SIP that Professor
Fontaine associates with PIB does much to support his argument
for including PIB under the category of manslaughter. But as Professor Fontaine examines the SIP/PIB context, he finds himself
getting curious about associated mental categories, including psychopathy and antisocial personality disorder.5' This is an admirable
and welcome extension of his work, because the questions he raises
about PIB, in terms of both scientific validity and conceptual coherence and legal applicability, resonate with these other
disorders. Therefore, I suggest the problems that have arisen in
treating psychopathy and ASP in legal contexts reflect back on Professor Fontaine's theory of homicide culpability in interesting ways.
When we examine psychopathy and its cousin ASP, 54 we enter

the very vexing category of personality disorders. It is vexing because the things we call personality disorders are simultaneously
unresolved in their causation and remarkably hard to cure. Thus, it
is sometimes hard to see the medical utility of these disorder diagnoses-their value may lie more in cultural anthropology or
sociology. When we look at the definitions of antisocial personality,
as with other disorders, we often encounter a somewhat tautological sum of its symptoms. A personality disorder is conventionally
defined as a rigid and persistent pattern of thought and action (or,
in more technical vocabulary, a "cognitive module" or a "fixed fantasy" or "dysfunctional schemata"). Moreover, this fixed mindset is
a disorder if it "deviates
markedly from the expectations of indi5
vidual's culture.0

The key personality disorders are delineated in colorful vocabulary. There are the "odd or eccentric disorders," including the
paranoid disorder and the schizoid and schizotypal disorders.
There are the so-called "dramatic, emotional, or erratic" disorders,
including the antisocial, the borderline, the histrionic, and the
narcissistic. There are, as well, the "anxious or fearful" disorders,
52.

Id. at 160.

Id. at 156-57.
Robert D. Hare, Psychopathy and Antisocial Personality Disorder: A Case of Diagnostic
Confusion, 13 PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, Feb. 1996, at 39, 39-40.
55.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DisORDERS TEXT REVISION 685 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].
53.
54.
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including the avoidant-anxious, the dependent, and the obsessivecompulsive.
The psychology of personality disorders does not inspire scientific confidence. Each personality disorder seems to blend genetic,
neurobiological, and environmental causes. Most of these disorders seem remarkably resistant to treatment, especially any
psychoanalytically-oriented approach that requires critical selfconsciousness . Perhaps as a corollary, the personality disorders
play only a very small role in criminal law. Such a disorder as ASP
would almost surely fail as a basis for a NGI defense or proof of
automatistic loss of control. And a personality disorder can rarely
negate a required mens rea, because it is more a matter of the
quality of attitude and interaction than of deficiency in cognition
or rational awareness. 551
Professor Fontaine shows some interest in ASP because it bears
some relationship to the kinds of deficiencies he wishes to put in
the HOP category, especially the PIB phenomenon. According to
the DSM-IV, the Antisocial Personality is "a pervasive pattern of disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others" that begins in
childhood or early adolescence and continues into adulthood.5 9 But
as Professor Fontaine notes, the chief new claims of science in regard to law in this area have come more from neurology and biology
56.
Id. at 690.
The professional/scientific descriptions of each tend to identify certain sub57.
variants of "talking therapies" suitable for particular disorders, with much jargon suggesting
significant variations among these therapies. But all these recommended therapies are essentially modest protocols for marginal control through behavioral or cognitive
management and, less often, with symptom-alleviating medication. The symptoms are not,
in the short-run, egregious enough to warrant the power of anti-psychotic drugs.
The great irony is that one of the personality disorders-the antisocial personal58.
ity-plays an inculpatory role in the death penalty-in other words, the commonest
manifestation anywhere in the legal system of a personality disorder as a legal issue arises on
the state and not the defense side. This may be the only example of a supposedly diagnostic
syndrome that a prosecutor would offer in aggravation-whereby the prosecutor will borrow
from supposedly medical language and not fear that to do so will risk the jury's excusing the
defendant's behavior. John Blume & David Voisin, Avoiding or Challenginga Diagnosis of Antisocial PersonalityDisorder,24J. CRIM.JUsT. EDUC. & RES., Mar. 2002, at 12.

59.

DSM-IV-TR, supra note 55, at 706. The antisocial pattern includes:

(1) failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by
repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest (2) deceitfulness, as indicated
by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning others for personal profit or pleasure
(3) impulsivity or failure to plan ahead (4) irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated
by repeated physical fights or assaults (5) reckless disregard for safety of self or others
(6) consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent
work behavior or honor financial obligations (7) lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another.
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than psychology. ° One consequence thereof has been an argument for a greater distinction between ASP and psychopathy.
Neuroscience researchers now use advanced brain scan techniques
to identify neural indicia of psychopathic traits, inspired by the
work of neuroscientist Robert Hare and his creation of the Psychopathy Checklist of defining traits.61 The gist of the current debate is
that the neuroscience researchers believe that the DSM definition
of ASP is flawed in several ways. 2 The newer approach is to see that
the distinguishing feature of psychopathy lies in certain affective
deficits in the person, whereas ASP inheres more in simply behavioral manifestations. The promoters of this research make strong
claims about the criminological significance of their work, because,
they assert, psychopathy is much more relevant to crime propensity
than is ASP.63
Thus, brain scan research has suggested, if not established, that
observable biological signs in the brain are strongly correlated with
such psycho-linguistic deficits as difficulty in distinguishing abstract
from concrete words. Those with psychopathic brains, as categorized according to brain-scan signs of "anterior cingulate
dysfunction," exhibit difficulty in recognizing fearful vocal affect in
others, in understanding emotional metaphors in the language of
others, and in experiencing rational fear themselves. 4 The posited
category of the psychopathic brain must work on cognitive overload to process and evaluate affective stimuli. 6 And, remarkably,

researchers exhibit confidence that these neurologically-diagnosed
60.

John Seabrook, Suffering Souls, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 10, 2008, at 64.

61.

ROBERT

D. HARE,

WITHOUT CONSCIENCE: THE DISTURBING

WORLD OF THE PSY-

AMONG US (Guilford Press, 1999); Robert D. Hare, A Research Scale for the
Assessment of Psychopathy in CriminalPopulations, I PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
111 (1980).
62.
Precisely because it relies so much on specific conduct indicators, the DSM's version of ASP suffers from the tautology problem that arises with personality disorders
generally, and it may accept this problem as unavoidable because the need to establish consensus criteria in a medical textbook may require a more common denominator for
uniformity than is scientifically useful. Michael Levenson, Kent Kielhl & Cory Fitzpatrick,
Assessing Psychopathic Attributes in a Noninstitutionalized Population, 68 J. PERSONALITY AND
SOC. PSYCHOL. 151, 152 (1995); Greg Miller, Investigating the Psychopathic Mind, 321 ScI.
1284, 1285 (2008).
63.
In their view, while the vast majority of prison inmates exhibit ASP, only 15-25 percent exhibit signs of neurologically measured psychopathy, and that smaller number may
represent a great disproportion of those likely to recidiviate. Kent Kiehl, A Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective on Psychopathy: Evidence for ParalimbicSystem Dysfunction, 142 PSYCHIATRY RES.
107, 109 (2006).
64.
Id. at 111. See generally Kent Kiehl et al., Semantic and Affective Processing in Psychopaths: An Event-Related PotentialStudy, 36 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 765 (1999); Sherrie Williamson
et al., Abnormal Processing of Affective Words By Psychopaths, 283 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 260
(1991).
65.
Kiehl, supra note 63, at 120-22.
CHOPATH
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psychopaths can find significant amelioration through "talking
therapies." Indeed, it is precisely the researchers who rely on neurological analyses of psychopathy who have been promoting the
feasibility of behavioral and cognitive therapies as realistic ways of
treating or mitigating the criminal tendencies of psychopaths, and
who have thereby challenged the conventional wisdom, rooted in
the narrower ASP diagnosis, that treatment is impossible and that
effort at treatment may even backfire.66 And these researchers,
quixotically or not, hold out hope that their work will provide the
basis for criminal defenses in the scientifically informed courtrooms of the future.67
Moreover, if Professor Fontaine extended his inquiry more fully
into the area of personality disorders, he would find one such
disorder that might qualify under his broad theory of HOP excuse.
This is the syndrome known as Borderline Personality Disorder.
The name of this disorder does not mean that the person is on the
borderline between neurosis and psychosis. Rather, the person is
on the borderline of having a definable personality-or a moral
self-in the first place. 68 As with other mental disorders, the causes
of BPD are complex and unknown. BPD is often associated with a
history of childhood trauma (possibly child sexual abuse), along
with the usual mix of genetic predisposition, neurobiological
factors, and brain abnormalities. In general, medication and talk
therapy are methods of treating borderline personality disorder,
although claims of new therapeutic innovations often sound to the
E.g., Michael Caldwell et al., Evidence of Treatment: Progress and Therapeutic Outcomes
66.
Among Adolescents with PsychopathicFeatures,34 CRIM.JUST. & BEHAV. 573 (2007).
Miller, supra note 62, at 1286. But see Peter Arnett et al., Autonomic Responsivity in
67.
Psychopaths: A Critical Review and Theoretical Proposal, 17 CLIN. PSYCHOL. REy. 903 (1997)
(suggesting incorrigibility of psychopaths); Donald Mitchell et al., Risky Decisions and Response Reversal: Is There Evidence of Orbitofrontal Cortex Dysfunction in Psychopathic Individuals?,
40 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 2013 (2002).
68.
DSM IV-TR, supra note 55, at 706. Here are some of the now-established indicia of
BPD:
(1) frantic efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment ... (2) a pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal relationships characterized by alternating between
extremes of idealization and devaluation (3) a markedly and persistently unstable
self-image or sense of self (4) impulsivity [in such forms as promiscuous sex, eating
disorders, binge eating, substance abuse, reckless driving] (5) recurrent suicidal behavior, gestures, threats, or self-mutilaing behavior [such as cutting, interfering with
the healing of scars, or picking at oneself] (6) affective instability due to a marked reactivity of mood (e.g., intense episodic dysphoria, irritability, and [bouts of anxiety]
(7) chronic feelings of emptiness (8) inappropriate anger or difficulty controlling
anger ... (9) transient stress-related paranoid ideation, delusions or severe
dissociative symptoms.
Id. at 710.
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skeptical outsider as merely trendy variations in the standard
techniques of cognitive behavioral therapy. 6" The incidence of BPD
has been calculated at between 1 to 3 percent of the American
adult population, and the great majority of the affected group are
female."' But most notably, the neurological explanation of BPD
resonates with its more imagistic suggestion of a lack of coherent
self.7 A fully developed theory of HOP excuse might well seek to
include BPD among the types of explicable deficits that could
arguably qualify for partial mitigation. BPD surely differs from PIB,
but there are interesting resonances between the diagnoses and
prognoses, as well as the mitigating moral quality, of these
conditions.7 2

A. The Morally UncomprehendingCriminal

If Professor Fontaine were to pursue the link between HOP excuse and the varieties of personality disorder, he would recognize
that this psychological inquiry would necessarily loop right back to
the questions of moral philosophy that seem close to the heart of
excuse theory. Indeed, strongly implicit in much of his discussion
of HOP is that certain deficits are inherent in the self, not volitionally chosen in any sense, and therefore merit some recognition in
criminal liability.
The philosophical dimension of the psychopathy and ASP debate now sounds in the fashionable language of "moral luck.' 3 An
early major foundational treatment of the subject in regard to
criminal law was that of Peter Arenella, in his articles dealing with
69.
One such new claim involves so-called "dialectical behavioral therapy" emphasizing an exchange and negotiation between therapist and client, between tile
rational and the
emotional, and between acceptance and change. See Kelly Koerner & Marsha Linehan, Research on Dialectical Behavior Therapy for Patients with Borderline Personality Disorder, 23
PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 151, 152 (2000).
70.
DSM IV-TR, supra note 55, at 708.
71.
Thus, the BPD suffers neurological impairment of what we would describe as a coherent ego, because of an eerie correlation between an early history of abuse and decreases
in the size of the adult hippocampus and amygdala. And hence, greater likelihood of overstimulation, to the effect that the individual would be more traumatized by the memories
and more closely attached to the emotions recalled. This condition reduces the amount of
communication or integration between hemispheres at any given time, thereby causing one
hemisphere to dominate the emotions of the individual and hence drastic fluctuation in
affect and conduct. On the neurobiological research on BPD, see Marianne Goodman et al.,
rauma, Genes, and the Neurobiology of PersonalityDisorders, 1032 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 104
(2004).
72.
Heidi Maibom, Moral Unreason: The Casefor Psychopathy, 20 MIND & LANGUAGE 237
(2005).
73.
For an excellent discussion, see Litton, supranote 46, at 352-66.

FALL

2009]

Values of Interdisciplinarityin Law Reform

this question: Can a person who is inherently incapable of appreciating the moral implications of his actions, although he is perfectly
sane and has perfectly normal cognition in every other way, be
blamed for his acts?7 4 Arenella focuses on the character who is
categorically incapable of appreciating the moral phenomenon of
the interests or needs of others. For Arenella, moral agency requires the following character-based abilities and attributes:
[T]he capacity to care for the interests of other human beings, the internalization of others' normative expectations
(including self-identification as participant in a culture's
moral blaming practices), the possession of p-r 75 attitudes
concerning one's own and others' characters and acts, the
ability to subject one's non-moral ends and values to moral
evaluation, the capacity to respond to moral norms as a motivation for one's choices, and the power to manage those
firmly entrenched aspects of character that impair one's ability to make an appropriate moral evaluation of the situation
one is in and the choices open to one. 7(1
He recognizes the fundamental "control principle," i.e., that people should not be held responsible for events or circumstances
they cannot control, and he laments that many philosophers adhering to the control principle draw an arbitrary line by failing to
acknowledge that some offenders do not have control-act freedom
over how to do and how to be. Arenella recognizes that he is
thrusting himself into knotty debates over "hard" vs. "soft" determinism.77 He would not excuse the psychopath for whom moral
74.
Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationshipbetween Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCI A L. REV. 1511 (1992) [hereinafter Convicting the Morally
Blameless]; Peter Arenella, Character, Choice and Moral Agency: The Relevance of Characterto Our
Moral CulpabilityJudgments, 7 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 59 (1990).

75.
"P-r" refers to the concept of participant-reactive attitudes described by Strawson,
i.e., the minimally human menu of emotions and attitudes that result from interaction with
others, whether remorse, blame, indignation, etc., that lend human color to the otherwise
bloodless concept of responsibility. Arenella, Convictingthe Morally Blameless, supra note 74, at
1609.
76.
Id.; see also GALEN STRAWSON, FREEDOM AND BELIEF 1-21 (1986).
77.
He concedes that these debates are complicated by the powerful "choice-theorist"
position of Michael Moore, who proffers the strongest version of the control principle as
demanding only purely instrumental reasoning and physical opportunity. Michael Moore,
Choice, Characterand Excuse, 7 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 29 (1990). Arenella also notes such alternatives as the group he calls "actual-sequence" theorists-those who base responsibility on
'the presence of certain responsibility-attribution conditions (which would include my account of moral agency capacities) and the absence of other responsibility-defeating
conditions (e.g., 'compulsion') in the actual causal stream that ended in the individual's
action." Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless, supra note 74, at 1612 n. 118 (citing Harry
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judgment and moral motivation are simply much more difficult
than for others; he worries about those for whom, as a threshold
matter once adult legal responsibility sets in, they are impossible. So
if Professor Fontaine is committed to a coherent psychological explanation of PIB and to giving it legal valence, I would press him to
consider how it compares to Arenella's depiction of the moral desert of the amoral psychopath.
This set of issues also invokes the more explicit discussion of the
phenomenon of moral luck. Two of the pivotal works on moral
luck78 are Bernard Williams's general invocation of the problem79
and Thomas Nagel's classification of its four key forms.8 ° As explained by Nagel, resultant luck is about decision under uncertainty:
the question whether the virtue or propriety of an intentional action should be evaluated in terms of whether it succeeded and in
what way.8 Circumstantial luck is about the situation one nonvolitionally finds oneself in, so that two people with similar moral
qualities and even goals may end up differing widely in terms of
the good or bad things they do by virtue of the vagaries of the
situations they end up in. 2 And there is causal luck, which might be
distinguished from the first two because it is about antecedent
things and about events, not conditions.""
But most relevant to my subject, and Arenella's, is constitutive
luck. This phenomenon concerns the arguably arbitrary and reFrankfurt, Alternate Possibilitiesand Moral Responsibility, in MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 143 (John
Martin Fischer ed., 1986)).
78.
For a comprehensive and reliable guide to the entire moral luck debate, see
Dana K. Nelkin, Moral Luck, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, http://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-luck/ (substantive revision on June 3, 2008) (on file with
the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
79.
Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, 50 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 115 (1976).
80.
THOMAS NAGEL, MoralLuck, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 24-38 (1979).
81.
Id. at 28-29. So there is Williams's famous example of a fictionalized Paul Gauguin
abandoning his family to set out for the South Seas to develop his art, and the question is
whether the virtue of that choice should depend on whether in fact he succeeds in his artistic mission. Nelkin, supra note 78. Of course, a venerable problem of "resultant luck" arises
in the law of attempt, as we wonder why punishment should depend on the random question of how things turn out after the weapon is fired. And in classic evaluations of this issue,
we see standard rationalizing tropes: some argue that the law of differential punishment is
wrong, while some argue that the notion that this is pure luck rests on a false epistemological premise about how well we know the original intention, while others change the subject
more drastically from retributivist to utilitarian goals by finding some deterrent value in
punishing differentially even if desert is the same.
82.
NAGEL, supra note 80, at 33-34. Another famous example here is the pair of two
potential Nazi collaborators, one of whom has the luck to be sent by her employer out of
Germany and thereby never has the opportunity to help Hitler. Nelkin, supra note 78.
83.
On causal luck, see Benjamin C. Zipursky, Two Dimensions of Responsibility in Crime,
Tort, and Moral Luck 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 97 (2008). But as is probably obvious,
causal luck may be a redundant category, supplied by Nagel simply as a device for injecting
the vocabulary of the free will question into the moral luck debate.
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ceived set of traits or dispositions that one manifests at the point
that one ostensibly can begin to exercise adult free will. Since our
genes, caregivers, peers, and other environmental influences all
contribute to making us who we are (and since we have no control
over these), "who we are" is at least largely a matter of luck. In this
sense, we are not responsible for being "inherently" cowardly or
indifferent, nor do we merit praise for being "inherently" brave or
smart or generous.
Nagel describes and agonizes over the philosophical problem:
I believe that in a sense the problem has no solution, because
something in the idea of agency is incompatible with actions
being events, or people being things. But as the external determinants of what someone has done are gradually exposed,
in their effect on consequences, character, and choice itself, it
becomes gradually clear that actions are events and people
things. Eventually nothing remains which can be ascribed to
the responsible self, and we are left with nothing but a portion of the larger sequence of events, which can be deplored
or celebrated, but not blamed or praised s4
The debates over moral luck have been voluminous in recent years.
The issue seems to torture our best thinkers, forcing them to execute a variety of feints, maneuvers, and rationalizations. Often
these moves involve a change of subject from solving the problem
to asserting the moral or other benefits or the necessity of not solving the problem. Some philosophers deny that, despite
appearances, there really is moral luck in the first place. Some accept the existence of moral luck while rejecting or restricting the
so-called Control Principle. Some insist that we cannot look at
moral luck as a monolith-that some of Nagel's sub-types exist,
that some do not exist, and that they vary in how well we can explain them. Some take a mixed approach, embracing one
approach for one kind of luck and another approach for another
kind of luck, or address only a certain type of luck, while ignoring
others. 5
84.
NAGEL, supranote 80, at 37.
85.
For a review of some of the rationalizations, see Darren Domsky, Tossing the Rotten
Things Out:EliminatingBad Reasons Not To Solve the Problem of Moral Luck, 80 PHIL. 531 (2005).
Many of these approaches are subtle or not-so-subtle ways of changing the subject. One
approach is to insist that the predicate notion of moral evaluation is more complicated than
we might first think. Thus, despite the attractive simplicity of the control principle, there are
several different ways in which we make assessments, including judgments of a person's
moral character ("aretaic" judgments), judgments of states of affairs that concern people's
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Some writers are tempted to wring their hands over the metaphysical question and change the subject or focus again, saying
that for purposes of moral assessment, it does not matter who you
are, but what you do with who you are. There is an appealing
poignancy to that way of refraining the question, but it is also a way
of conceding that even all the heroic rationalizations of resultant
and circumstantial luck end up failing to meet the challenge of
constitutive moral luck. Thus, for a few examples, Susan Wolf "argues that there is a 'nameless virtue' which consists in 'taking
responsibility for one's actions and their consequences.' "8s "It is
the virtue of taking responsibility in some sense for the consequences of one's actions, even if one is not responsible for them.
In some ways it is akin to the virtue of generosity in that it 'involves
a willingness to give more . .. than justice requires.""" Some who
concede the existence of luck demand that we drastically change
our moral practices. Thus, "if the Control Principle is false, we
ought not to respond to an agent's wrongdoing with anger and
blame that is 'against' him, but rather with anger that does not include hostility or the desire to punish. ' .. Some "have denied the
existence of causal, and perhaps also of constitutive, moral luck by
offering a distinctive metaphysical account of human agency."8 9
Another strategy is to suggest that moral luck is much less of a
problem once we eschew an overly idealized conception of human
agency and deploy instead a notion of morality that accepts human
impurity. ' Michael Zimmerman examines the predicate issue of

actions as "good" or "bad" ("axiological" judgments), or judgments of actions as "right" or
"wrong" ("deontic"judgments). Nelkin, supra note 78.
86.
Nelkin, supra note 78 (quoting Susan Wolf, The Moral of Moral Luck, 31 PHILOSOPHIC EXCHANGE 4, 13 (1990)).
87.
Id. (quoting Wolf, supra note 86, at 14).
88.
Id. (citing Brynmor Browne, A Solution to the Problem of Moral Luck, 42 PHILOSOPHICAL Q. 343, 350 (1992)).
89.
Id. Under so-called "Agent-Causal Libertarianism," "agents themselves cause actions or at least the formation of intentions, without their being caused to do so. Thus, the
agent herself as a substance, exercising her causal powers is an undetermined cause of her
intentions." Id. According to some "agent-causal views," "only the agent, as opposed to
events caused by other events is the cause of the intention." Id. (citing TIMOTIY O'CONNOR,
PERSONS AND CAUSES: THE METAPHYSICS OF FREE WILL

(2000)).

90.
By this view, "the control principle is far from obvious, and we would not want to
live in a world in which it held sway." Id. Again, this argument is a subject-changer, suggesting that without moral luck, we would lose access to certain highly desirable virtues.
Margaret Urban Walker argues that "moral luck threatens paradox only in the context of a
view of moral agents as noumenal" or pure. Margaret U. Walker, Moral Luck and the Virtues of
Agency, 22 METAPHILOSOPHY 14-27 (1991). Thus, by accepting that our "responsibilities
outrun control," we can celebrate the virtue of dependability by recognizing that others may
rely on us, even if their needs are not in our control. Id. at 19. By contrast, in a world of
"pure agency," much less will be morally expected of us, and we will not be expected to "as-
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how we know which traits of an individual are "essential" or "constitutive" and which are not, and laments that in this context "the
role that luck plays in the determination of moral responsibility
may not be entirely eliminable."9' The most confident assertions
have come from Nicholas Rescher, who argues that "[o] ne cannot
meaningfully said to be lucky in regard to who one is, but only with
respect to what happens to one. Identity must precede luck.0 2 A
careful examination of Rescher's texts do not help us tremendously to see how he generates or supports this argument, but as
one commentator has said, we have to note that Rescher "is working with a notion of luck that differs from the notion of 'lack of
control.' "

According to Rescher, something is lucky if (i) itcame about
"by accident" where this seems to mean something like "unplanned" or "unexpected" or "out of the ordinary" and (ii)
the outcome "has a significantly evaluative9 4status in representing a good or bad result, a benefit or loss.
In this sense, it may seem an impossible dilemma to determine
whether one's identity is a matter of luck or not, and yet it still
seems intuitively plausible to say that one's identity is not a matter
within one's control.
As Professor Fontaine continues his impressive project of classification, he may find himself moving in several directions. If his
jurisprudential efforts to build a more coherent legal taxonomy
lead him, as it predictably and admirably does, to draw on psychology, then the psychological classifications may complicate his
efforts, and, as I have suggested, will also lead him to issues in
moral philosophy, since the linkage of psychology and law raises
vexing problems of free will.

sunme a share of the ongoing and massive human work of caring, healing, restoring, and
cleaning-up on which each separate life and the collective one depend." Id. at 25.
91.
MichaelJ. Zinmennan, TakingLuck Seriously, 99J. PHIL. 553, 575 (2002).
92.
Nicholas Rescher, Moral Luck, in MORAL LUCK 155 (Daniel Statman ed., 1993).
93.
Nelkin, supra note 78.
94.
Id. (quoting Rescher, supra note 92, at 145).

